How do our minds relate to the physical world? Can our thoughts and experiences be fully explained by the workings of the brain, or is there more to consider? In this course, we will focus on key debates about the nature of the mind, exploring different perspectives on whether the mind is something entirely distinct from the body or deeply connected to it. We’ll also explore questions about what makes something capable of having thoughts or feelings—whether it’s the structure of the brain, the way it functions, or something else entirely. We will examine questions of personal identity: What makes you you? Is it your mind, your body, or something else that grounds your identity over time? Additionally, we will explore whether machines or other non-organic systems could ever truly have minds. Finally, we’ll consider how advancements in technology challenge and reshape our understanding of what it means to think, feel, and be.

By the end of the course you will be able to:

• explain and evaluate important concepts and arguments in the philosophy of mind;

• reflectively analyze and develop your own reasoned views of them;

• understand and interpret primary and secondary philosophical texts;

• do all this in appropriately academic oral and written forms, individually and in groups.

Class attendance is required. You are allowed two unexcused absences without penalty to your Attendance grade. Additional unexcused absences will lower your Attendance grade.

Each absence, excused or unexcused, will negatively affect your Class Engagement grade. Regardless of whether absences are excused, missing class discussions will hinder your understanding of the material and your ability to meet course objectives. To earn credit for missed Class Engagement, and to make up for the learning missed by not being in class, you can complete extra work assigned by me.

You cannot make-up a major exam (midterm or final) without the permission of the Academic Dean’s Office. The Academic Dean’s Office will grant such permission only when the absence was caused by a serious impediment, such as a documented illness, hospitalization or death in the immediate family (in which you must attend the funeral) or other situations of similar gravity. Absences due to other meaningful conflicts, such as job interviews, family celebrations, travel difficulties, student misunderstandings or personal convenience, will not be excused. Students who will be absent from a major exam must notify the Academic Dean’s Office prior to that exam. Absences from class due to the observance of a religious holiday will normally be excused. Individual students who will have to miss class to observe a religious holiday should notify the instructor by the end of the Add/Drop period to make prior arrangements for making up any work that will be missed. 

Students seeking an Academic Dean's Office excuse should submit the Excused Absences form: https://forms.office.com/Pages/ResponsePage.aspx?id=JjSgbcXUYUyLWwzRnlSs6eIgbYvYjK1IoctPI6J6xoFUOVo3S1BaVDJWTEdPMDE2OTdSMExJOEdaNC4u

NOTE: This syllabus is intended to give you guidance in what may be covered during the semester. I reserve the right to modify, supplement, and make changes as the course needs arise.

Week 1 (January 20 – 24): Introduction to Each Other and to Philosophy of Mind

Week 2 (January 27 – 31): Methods of Philosophy & Mind and Mentality

• Rajczi, Alex. Core Techniques: A Primer on the Methods of Philosophy. Chs. 1–3.
• Rajczi, Alex.  Workbook: A Primer on the Methods of Philosophy. Chs. 1–3.
• Kind, Amy. Philosophy of Mind: The Basics. New York: Routledge, 2020. Ch. 1: “Mind and Mentality.”
• Optional reading:
  •  Anthony, Louise. "The Mental and the Physical." InThe Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, edited by Robin Le Poidevin, 555–567. London: Routledge, 2009. Especially pp. 555–559.

Week 3 (February 3 - 7): Substance Dualism

• Descartes, René. Meditations on First Philosophy, Meditations II and VI. Excerpts from Passions of the Soul.
• Elisabeth of Bohemia. Correspondence with Descartes (May 6 & 10, 1643).
• Arnauld, Antoine. "Objections and Replies," Fourth Set of Objections. In The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, Vol. II, translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, 137–153. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
• Optional readings:
  • McWeeny, Jen. “Princess Elisabeth and the Mind-Body Problem.” Hypatia 26, no. 4 (2011): 824–847.
  • Kind, Amy. Philosophy of Mind: The Basics. New York: Routledge, 2020. Ch. 2: “Dualism” [Intro to chapter & “Cartesian Dualism” (pp. 22-39).]
  •  Ryle, Gilbert. “Descartes’ Myth.” In The Concept of Mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949.

Week 4 (February 10 - 14): Physicalism

•  Ryle, Gilbert. “Descartes’ Myth.” In The Concept of Mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949.
•  Salazar, Heather. “Materialism and Behaviorism.” Introduction to Philosophy: Philosophy of Mind.
•  Smart, J.J.C. “Sensations and Brain Processes.” The Philosophical Review 68, no. 2 (1959): 141–156.
•  Optional reading:
  • Kind, Amy. Philosophy of Mind: The Basics. New York: Routledge, 2020. Ch. 3: “Physicalism.” [Sections: Intro to chapter, “General Motivations for Physicalism,” & “Different Versions of Physicalism” (pp. 48-63).]
  •  Churchland, Paul M. "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes." InPhilosophy of Mind, edited by David Chalmers, 470–482. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021.

Week 5 (February 17 - 21): From Physicalism to Functionalism

• Putnam, Hilary. “The Nature of Mental States.” In Mind, Language, and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2, 429–440. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.

•  Lewis, David. “Mad Pain and Martian Pain.” In Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Volume 1, edited by Ned Block, 216–222. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980. [Read up to the end of Section 3 (pp. 216-218).]

•  Optional reading:

  • Kind, Amy. Philosophy of Mind: The Basics. New York: Routledge, 2020. Ch. 4: “Functionalism.” [Sections: Intro to chapter, “The Roots of Functionalism,” & “What is Functionalism?” (pp. 76-83).]
  • Antony, Louise. "The Mental and the Physical." In Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, edited by Brian McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen, 5–20. Oxford: Blackwell, 2007.
  •  Montero, Barbara. "The Body Problem."Noûs 33, no. 2 (1999): 183–200. Especially pp. 183–188.

Week 6 (February 24-28): From Physicalism to Functionalism 

(We meet three times this week. Tuesday, Thursday, and Friday.)

• Block, Ned. “Troubles With Functionalism.” In Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Volume 1, edited by Ned Block, 268–305. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980. [Sections: Intro, 1.1, & 1.2.]
• Newman, Jason. “Functionalism.” Introduction to Philosophy: Philosophy of Mind.
• Nagel, Thomas. “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” The Philosophical Review 83, no. 4 (1974): 435–450.
•  Further (optional) reading:
  • Kind, Amy. Philosophy of Mind: The Basics. New York: Routledge, 2020. Ch. 4: “Functionalism.” [Section: “Assessing Functionalism” (pp. 86-96)]
  • Bennett, Karen. "Mental Causation."Philosophy Compass 2, no. 2 (2007): 316–337. Sections 1, 2, and 5.

Week 7: (March 3 -7) - Mid-Term Exam Week

SPRING BREAK (March 10-14)

Week 8 (March 17-21): Consciousness - Non-Physicalism about Subjective Experience 

• Chalmers, David J. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. [Excerpts]

• Kind, Amy. “Chalmers’ Zombie Argument.” InPhilosophy of Mind: The Basics. New York: Routledge, 2020.
• Jackson, Frank. “Epiphenomenal Qualia.”The Philosophical Quarterly 32, no. 127 (1982): 127–136.
• Gertler, Brie. “The Knowledge Argument.” InContemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, edited by Brian McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen, 257–276. Oxford: Blackwell, 2007.

Week 9 (March 24-28): Consciousness

• Drayson, Zoë. “Philosophy of Phenomenal Consciousness.” InThe Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Consciousness, edited by Uriah Kriegel, 288–290. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. [Selections]
•  Levine, Joseph. “Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap.”Pacific Philosophical Quarterly64, no. 4 (1983): 354–361. [First 4 pages only: Sections 16.1, 16.2, and 16.3.]
•  Chalmers, David J. “The Hard Problem of Consciousness.”Journal of Consciousness Studies2, no. 3 (1995): 200–219.
•  Hare, Caspar.Can Science Teach Us Everything? (Video). Available at:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o6ooV-19NLY.
• Optional reading:
  •  Bennett, Karen. "Why I Am Not a Dualist."
  • Akins, Kathleen. "A Bat Without Qualities." InPhilosophy: The Quest for Truth, edited by Louis P. Pojman and Lewis Vaughn, 597–606. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
  •  Blackmore, Susan J. "What Is It Like to Be...?" InConsciousness: An Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
  •  Wilkes, Kathleen V. "Is Consciousness Important?"British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (September 1984): 223–243.
  •  Chalmers, David J. "Consciousness and Its Place in Nature." In The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind, edited by Stephen Stich and Ted Warfield, 102–142. Oxford: Blackwell, 2003.

Week 10 (March 31 - April 4): Consciousness—Physicalism vs. Non-Physicalism

• Churchland, Patricia Smith. “Are Mental States Irreducible to Neurobiological States?”

• Tye, Michael. “The Puzzle of Transparency.”

• Optional readings:
  • Balog, Katalin. "Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem." Philosophical Review 108, no. 4 (1999): 497–528.
  • Churchland, Patricia S. "The Hornswoggle Problem." Journal of Consciousness Studies 3, no. 5–6 (1996): 402–408.
  • Churchland, Patricia S.Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind/Brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986.
  • Levin, Janet. "Could Love Be Like a Heatwave? Physicalism and the Subjective Character of Experience." Philosophical Studies 49 (March 1986): 245–261.

Week 11 (April 7 - 11): Consciousness & Intentionality

•  Perry, John. Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness, pp. 226–227. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001. “Subjectivity” [Only pp. 226-227]
•  Montague, Michelle. “Recent Work on Intentionality.”Analysis 70, no. 4 (2010): 765–778. [Section 1 (pp. 765-768).]
•  Kind, Amy. Philosophy of Mind: The Basics. New York: Routledge, 2020. Ch. 5: “Machine Minds”[Selections].

Week 12 (April 14-18):  Personal Identity  

• Locke, John. “Of Identity and Diversity.” InAn Essay Concerning Human Understanding, edited by Peter H. Nidditch, 335–342. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.
•  Parfit, Derek. Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984. [Chs. 10–13 (Excerpts).]

Week 13 (April 21-25): Self-Knowledge & The Future of Mind

• Macdonald, Cynthia. “Self-Knowledge and the ‘Inner Eye.’” Philosophical Explorations 1, no. 1 (1998): 83–106.
• Kind, Amy. Philosophy of Mind: The Basics. New York: Routledge, 2020. Ch. 6. “The Future of Mind” (selections)

Week 14 (April 28-30): Wrapping up

We meet only on Tuesday this week.